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ABSTRACT 
The study revisits the topic of post-acquisition performance of M&A in South Africa. Unlike 
preceding studies the emphasis was on target firms rather than acquiring firm and on 
operating performance rather than on share price reaction to M&A announcements. The study 
explores how operating performance is affected by BEE related M&A and non-BEE related 
M&A transactions. Operating performance is measured using EVA®. Economic Value Added 
(EVA®) reveals that target firms experienced a decline in post deal operating performance 
following an M&A transaction regardless of whether the M&A deal was motivated by BEE 
or not. The study also found that the decline in operating performance was larger for 
conventional (non-BEE) M&A transactions relative to BEE linked M&A transactions, though 
the decline was not statistically significant. Accounting based corporate performance 
measurement methods used to supplement the EVA® exhibit a marginal and insignificant 
increased in performance when the average five year post-acquisition returns are compared to 
the average five year pre-acquisition returns. Overall, the economic performance of target 
firms declined suggesting that target firms do not benefit significantly from the M&A.  
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an introduction, the aim and the context of the research as well as the 
research objectives. The chapter is structured as follows: section 1.2 outlines the context of 
the study.  Section 1.3 presents the research problem. Section 1.4 presents the research 
questions. Section 1.5 provides the significance of the study. Section 1.6 discusses the gap in 
the literature on mergers and acquisitions and section 1.7 highlights the benefits of the study 
and finally section 1.8 deals with the structure of the research report. The chapter summary 
concludes the chapter. 
  
1.2 Context of the study 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are an important milestone in a corporation’s existence. It is 
a subject of interest to many scholars and the general public especially when they involve a 
high profile corporation, such as the recent acquisition of Pepkor by Steinhoff international in 
South Africa in 2014. An acquisition of one firm by another is not only a strategic manoeuvre 
but also a means of achieving corporate growth (Ooghe et al., 2006). Corporations tend to use 
acquisition as a means of achieving growth, diversification or profitability (Ooghe et al., 
2006). It is the desire for growth that has led to an increase in mergers and acquisition 
activities, especially in Africa. African M&As have been robust with a majority of investors 
optimistic about the growing attractiveness of many African economies (Deal Driver Africa 
report, 2014). 
 
During an M&A transaction, managers typically cite the potential to increase the value of the 
firm and the returns to shareholders of the merging companies as a reason for engaging in a 
M&As. Mantravadi and Reddy, (2008) argue that there are three main objectives behind any 
M&A transaction, namely: faster growth in scale and quicker time to market; improvement of 
revenues and profitability and acquisition of new technology or competence. Chatterjee 
(1986) categorises the synergetic gains from M&A as financial synergy, operational synergy 
and collusive synergy. 
Whether or not the synergies from M&As actually materialise has been the subject of debate 
for some time. Many authors that have delved into the topic of M&A have demonstrated that 
M&A transactions create shareholder wealth, with most of the gains accruing to the target 
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company shareholders (e.g., Andrade et al., 2001). Conversely, Agrawal et al (1992) found 
that shareholders of acquiring firms tend to suffer losses of about 10% after the merger. 
 
The dawn of democracy in South Africa has contributed to an increase in M&A transactions. 
One of the main drivers of M&A activity in South Africa has been a type of transaction that 
is unique to South Africa, namely; Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) transactions 
(Davids and Hale, 2010). Following the democratic elections of 1994, the ANC government 
developed a programme in an attempt to reverse the social and economic inequalities created 
by apartheid era regulations that served to ensure the social and economic marginalisation of 
black people, (i.e. Africans, Coloured and Indian) in South Africa. Wolmarans and Sartorius 
,(2009) found that there are generally, three types of BEE transactions, namely: the sale of an 
equity stake to BEE Company, the purchase of a stake in a BEE company and other BEE 
transactions using strategic joint ventures and partnerships. Since the introduction of BEE, a 
number of transactions and BEE schemes focusing on the empowerment of black people have 
been put in place. This research aims to focus on the first type of BEE transaction identified 
by Wolmarans and Sartorius, (2009) and its impact on the target firms’ subsequent 
performance. 
 
Numerous studies have been conducted across the globe and domestically to determine if 
M&A truly add value to the transacting firm. Many of these studies focus on short-term 
changes in share prices on and after the merger/acquisition announcement date. A South 
African study on M&A by Smit and Ward, (2007) found that M&A do not result in 
significant increase in operating performance and that large acquisitions are a zero net present 
value project for the acquiring firm and its shareholders. Mushidzi and Ward, (2004) 
conclude that shareholders of target companies earn significantly positive returns, while 
shareholders of bidding companies are not affected. The findings by Smit and Ward (2007) as 
well as by Mushidzi and Ward, (2004) are similar to findings of studies conducted abroad. 
The similar findings may be attributed to the fact that both the South African and 
international authors looked at short-term returns around the M&A announcement date when 
they conducted their studies. Negash and Wimberly,(2004) concluded that firms engaging in 
M&A activity in South Africa do not persistently create positive abnormal returns over the 
long-term and that investors should avoid being long-term investors in companies that are 
actively involved in M&A as they suffer losses in the long-term. 
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The studies conducted in South Africa use share price changes as a measure of performance. 
Studies by Smit and Ward (2007) as well as Mushidzi and Ward (2004), are based on short-
term returns following announcement of the M&A event.  However, in reality synergies are 
observed over time, as a result it is the long-term operating performance of the firm that 
should be analysed in order to determine the impact of the M&A transaction on the firms 
performance and returns to shareholders, which is precisely what this study aims to achieve. 
 
The objective of this study is to assess the differential performance of BEE and non-BEE 
M&As in South Africa. Understanding this is very important as BEE is a policy issue 
implemented via the BBBEE act of 2003 in an effort to include Black South Africans into the 
main stream economy after being excluded by Apartheid era laws. Therefore, South African 
M&A activity has been spurred on not only by pure business interest but also by the need to 
implement the Black Economic Empowerment, as such when evaluating corporate 
performance of South African firms post the M&A transaction, it is important to distinguish 
between BEE related M&A and non-BEE M&A in order to clearly understand how the 
market reacts to both types of M&As.  
1.3 Research Problem  
The M&A literature (e.g. Ooghe et al., 2006) suggest that  a firm should only implement an 
acquisition strategy as a means of growth only if it expects to improve its organisational 
performance and it is preferable to alternative growth strategies. Agrawal et al., (1992) found 
that M&A do not add value to acquiring firms’ shareholders as the shareholders of acquiring 
firms experience a significant wealth loss of about 10% after the merger. According to 
findings by Agrawal et al., (1992), M&A offer no significant gains to shareholders; hence 
shareholders have to look elsewhere to achieve growth and diversification as M&As wipe out 
shareholder value.  
 
In recent years, studies found that managers pursue growth in physical size of their 
corporations rather than growth in its profits and stockholder welfare. This behaviour of 
managers is linked closely to the fact that management compensations (salaries, bonuses etc.) 
are related to the size of the entity compared to its profits (Mueller., 1969). Therefore, 
management tends to engage in M&As out of self-interest as opposed to being motivated by 
the need to increase shareholders welfare, which raises doubt on the use of M&A as a means 
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of increasing shareholder wealth. Evidence suggests that the shareholders of the acquiring 
firms earn on-average zero abnormal returns from the acquisitions (Fuller et al., 2002).  
 
Other studies found that shareholders of successful bidding companies tend to realise 
significant increase in equity values, although this increase is substantially lower than returns 
earned by the target firm (Jensen and Ruback., 1983). Yook (2004) argued that corporation 
do benefit from synergies and increase the combined equity value of the target and the 
acquiring firms, therefore suggesting that acquisitions create shareholder value. An intuitive 
reason for this value creation is that it comes from the fact that the combined entity enjoys 
reduced costs, charges higher prices for its products or both (Chatterjee, 1986). 
 
Alessandri et al., (2011) found that BEE deals created value when pursued in earnest, but 
destroyed value otherwise and that BEE deals resulted in positive and significant returns to 
shareholders when completed at a discount, but yielded negative returns when completed at a 
premium. Therefore this suggest that if conducted with the best intentions - to address the 
needs of various stakeholders such as government, communities and shareholders - BEE 
acquisitions could be value adding to the company and its shareholders. However, some 
shareholders are against BEE as they view it a business risk that could dilute their stake in the 
company (Alessandri et al., 2011). Negative abnormal returns suggest that investors perceive 
BEE transactions as an unnecessary and insignificant cost, as shares are ‘donated’ at a 
discount (Chipeta and Vokwana.,2011). 
Majority of studies that investigate the performance of M&A and impact on shareholder 
welfare were conducted in the US such as a study by Agrawal et al., (1992) and Moeller et 
al., (2005). Similar “event analysis” studies conducted in South Africa concur with their 
findings, for instance Mushidzi and Ward (2004) conclude that shareholders of target 
companies earn significant positive returns, while shareholders of bidding companies were 
not affected.  
 
Previous studies on M&A conducted in South Africa have not considered the impact of BEE 
related mergers and acquisitions on shareholders’ welfare and operating performance of the 
target firm. Furthermore, South African based studies on M&A have not investigated the 
impact of BEE related M&A on the target company relative to non-BEE related M&A. 
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This research study analyses the performance of target firms post M&A and whether there is 
a differential performance between ordinary M&As and BEE related M&As. The research 
study expands further by looking at the performance of companies that completed both types 
of deals and how each affected their performance.  BEE M&As have been criticised for 
diluting shareholder wealth (Alessandri et al., 2011).Conversely, non-BEE related M&A 
acquisitions are typically seen as creating value through synergies.  The paper will resolve the 
debate on whether or not BEE M&A enhance value by examining the performance of BEE 
related mergers and comparing them to traditional non-BEE related M&A. The comparison 
will help determine if value is created by BEE related M&A by benchmarking them against 
non-BEE related M&A. 
1.4 Research Questions 
Since 1994, the South African economy has opened up to the rest of the world which has 
resulted in an increase in competition faced by South African firms as a  result of 
international firms seeking new growth opportunities in Africa. This factor has resulted in an 
increase in M&A in South Africa as firms seek growth while others seek to defend their 
market power. 
 
The introduction of BBBEE has also served as one of the main drivers of mergers & 
acquisitions in South Africa. The debate on BEE has led to diverse views from society at 
large, some sections of the population have criticised BEE as benefiting only a hand full of 
well-connected individuals. Conversely, others praise BEE for its contribution to the 
economic inclusion and upliftment of Black people. Whether or not there are benefits related 
to M&A and what the impact of BEE is on corporate performance is a matter that this study 
aims to address.  
  
The following questions guide the research: 
 How do BEE related mergers and acquisitions perform in relation to non-BEE related 
acquisitions? Do BEE related M&A’s destroy or enhance value for the shareholders? 
 Is the effect of BEE and non-BEE deals on corporate performance dependent on the 
industry/sector in which it is happening? 
 How is a firm operating performance affected when a firm completes both a BEE and 
non-BEE M&A transaction? 
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1.5 Method of Study  
The study seeks to investigate and analyse the operating performance of target firms post 
BEE and non-BEE M&As. For comparability purposes the research focuses on the 
performance of the target firms involved in an M&A transaction as data relating to BEE 
acquirers is unavailable in the public domain, mainly because the acquirers are usually 
unlisted. Data for the study is sourced from Bloomberg database, SENS and the Intellidex 
BEE report. 
 
In measuring the performance of M&A in a South African context, this study utilises 
traditional accounting methods in conjunction with Economic Value Added (EVA) method. 
According to Yook (2004), firms may erode shareholder wealth while earning positive net 
income due to the fact that accounting earnings are subject to manipulation and earnings may 
be lower than the required rate of return that shareholders could earn from securities of 
comparable risk. EVA is a performance measure directly linked to the creation of shareholder 
wealth and it takes into account the riskiness of investment which is factored into the cost of 
capital (Yook, 2004).   
Despite the limitations in accounting based performance measurement techniques they still 
remain popular, relevant and a primary tool used in practice to evaluate investment decisions 
and measure corporate performance. Therefore, this study uses conventional accounting 
methods in conjunction with EVA when assessing the performance of M&As. 
1.6 Gap in the literature 
Numerous studies on M&A and BEE transactions have been conducted in South Africa. 
These have focused mainly on share price reaction to the announcement of a BEE transaction 
or a M&A transaction. These studies measure performance over a short-term period. For 
instance, Chipeta and Vokwana (2011) investigated the impact of BEE transaction on 
shareholder wealth and firm profitability using event study methodology and found that BEE 
related M&A result in negative returns after announcement. Mushidzi and Ward (2004) 
investigated the returns on cash vs share funded acquisitions by using similar short-term 
performance measures, and found that shareholders of bidding firms are not affected by 
acquisitions. Unlike the South African studies cited above, this study probes the long-term 
impact of the two transactions to determine whether they add value to the shareholders of the 
target firm by focusing on the operating performance of the target firm undertaking “normal” 
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or BEE related M&A. Few if any studies have addressed the impact that M&A have on 
operating performance subsequent to the merger and how the two types of M&A prevalent in 
South Africa compare. 
 
Although a vibrant media debate has emerged in South Africa on the BEE process, little 
academic analysis has been carried out so far (Alessandri et al., 2011). The research aims to 
fill this gap in academic literature on BEE related transactions and evaluate their impact on 
the companies’ operating performance relative to non-BEE related M&A. The study 
contributes to the literature on M&A in South Africa by answering the question on whether 
listed firms should engage in BEE compliant transaction or merely focus on traditional non-
BEE related transaction when seeking to expand operations through mergers and acquisitions 
in a South African environment.  
1.7 Benefits of the study 
The research aims to assist policy makers in continuously improving BEE policy which 
would accelerate Black Economic Empowerment and the inclusion of the marginalised Black 
society into the main stream economy of South Africa. In addition, the research aims to help 
companies and investors get a better understanding of the short-falls and benefits as well as 
the performance of BEE related mergers and acquisitions in a South African context. 
Furthermore the study will help investor and other stakeholders understand how the two types 
of M&A impact their wealth and value of the firm.  
1.8 Structure of the research report 
The remainder of this research report is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents a review of 
extant literature on BEE and mergers and acquisitions. Chapter 3 describes the methodology 
used in this study. Chapter 4 presents the research results and their interpretation. Chapter 5 
discusses the findings and concludes the study.  
Chapter summary 
This chapter introduces the thesis and identifies the gap in academic literature on M&As in 
South Africa.  It also highlights issues relating to BEE and non-BEE M&As in South Africa 
in addition to raising questions about the economic performance of BEE M&A compared to 
non-BEE M&A. The next chapter presents the literature review. 
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CHAPTER 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The current chapter contextualises the study by highlighting relevant literature pertaining to 
M&A and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). Section 2.2 presents different types of 
mergers and acquisitions including the motives behind them. Section 2.3 presents the 
performance of M&A deals. Section 2.4 presents the history of BEE and previous BEE 
research. Section 2.5 presents historic performance of BEE deals. Chapter summary 
completes the chapter.  
2.2 Mergers and Acquisitions 
Ross et al., (2003) defines a merger as the complete absorption of one firm by another. The 
acquiring firm can undertake this transaction by either acquiring stock or assets. A merger is 
regarded as a combination of any two or more firms with the larger being considered the 
acquirer (Green and Cromley., 1982). The terms merger and acquisition are generally used 
interchangeably by market practitioners and the public. No distinction is made between 
mergers and acquisitions because the effects of the two transactions are virtually 
indistinguishable (Green and Cromley., 1982).According to the South African Competition 
Act No.89 of 1998, a merger occurs when one or more firms directly or indirectly acquire or 
establish direct or indirect control over the whole or part of the business of another firm. This 
is the definition applied in this research.  
There are different types of mergers and acquisitions which can be classified into three broad 
categories, namely: horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers. Horizontal mergers 
happen when an acquisition of a firm in the same industry is made. The firms normally 
compete with each other in their product market. This type of merger is often geographic in 
nature and accompanied by economies of scale (Firer et al., 2004). The acquiring firm in a 
horizontal merger desires to increase its market share while simultaneously eliminating some 
of its competitors (Green and Cromley., 1982). A vertical acquisition involves firms at 
different steps of the production process. It can either be forward (toward the customer) or 
backward (in the direction of the suppliers of raw material). It leads to control of the value 
chain & consequently economies in distribution (Firer et al., 2004). In the case of a vertical 
merger the company desires to increase its control over more resources of supply and 
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distribution. Therefore the firm expand into associated product lines (Green and Cromley., 
1982).  
Conglomerate mergers and acquisitions occur when the offeror and the offeree company are 
not in the same lines of business; these are often justified by claiming diversification of risk 
or the lowering of the cost of capital in the large company (Firer et al., 2004). Conglomerate 
mergers represent expansion by a company into new and different product lines. The aim of 
this type of merger is to reduce business risk by the acquiring company by diversification of 
its interest (Green and Cromley., 1982). The main benefit of this kind of merger is the 
reduction in business risk of the firm provided that there is low to negative correlation 
between the various businesses making up the conglomerate firm.  Chatterjee (1986) argues 
that these types of mergers are motivated by financial synergies that stem from lower 
business risk due to diversification of the firms and thus ultimately resulting in lower cost of 
capital. 
The post M&A performance of a firm is significantly influenced by the firms’ motives for 
engaging in the transaction. Therefore in order to analyse the performance of a firm it is 
imperative to understand the motives and drivers of the M&A. Three major motives have 
been advanced in the literature on M&A as key drivers of M&A: The synergy motive; the 
agency motive and the hubris motive (Berkovitch & Narayanan., 1993).  
 
Synergies are cited by corporate managers as the main driver behind M&A and the main 
source from which benefits from the transaction will flow to the shareholders of the firm in 
the form of higher share price and economic performance. Empirical results show that 
synergy is the primary motive in takeovers with positive total gains (Berkovitch and 
Narayanan., 1993). Benecke et al., (2007) defines synergy as: “A concept that describes the 
systematic processes whereby business units of diverse, complex organisations will generate 
value through working as one system than working as separate entities”. According to Ross et 
al., (2003), synergy is the positive incremental net gain associated with the combination of 
two firms through a merger or acquisition. Synergies can be categorised in three broad 
categories according to Chatterjee, (1986) namely: collusive synergy; operational synergy 
and financial synergy. 
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Collusive synergies represent the class of scarce resources leading to market power 
(Chatterjee., 1986). Collusive synergies encompass those resources that the combined firm 
can exploit in order to gain greater market power and are typically associated with horizontal 
mergers. In such mergers profits can be enhanced through higher prices and reduced 
competition for customers (Ross et al., 2003). The combined firm is able to dominate the 
market as it enjoys monopolistic power and can increase prices of its product without loss of 
customers as it is the main supplier of the product/service in the market. 
 
Operational synergy represents the class of resources that lead to production and/or 
administrative efficiencies (Chatterjee., 1986). Operating synergies normally manifest 
through reduction of operating cost as a result of the firm being able to achieve economies of 
scale since the combined firm can source inputs cheaply and produce at a lower cost per unit. 
The operating synergies are normally associated with vertical mergers, which enable the firm 
to control the distribution process of its produce. 
 
Financial synergy represents the class of resources that leads to a reduction in the cost of 
capital. The financial synergies are normally associated with conglomerate mergers 
(Chatterjee., 1986). The firm is able to control a larger asset base which can be used as 
collateral thus resulting in lower cost of borrowing and ultimately lower cost of capital. In 
addition, conglomerate merges diversify the firm and thus lowering the systematic risk and 
the cost of capital. 
 
Other than synergy, agency motive is also cited as one of the reasons behind mergers and 
acquisitions. Agency motive suggests that mergers and acquisitions occur because they 
enhance the acquirers’ management welfare at the expense of the acquirer shareholders 
(Berkovitch & Narayanan., 1993).  According to Berkovitch & Narayanan, (1993) “specialist 
managers” tends to acquire firms in their line of business so that the success of the combined 
firm depends on their specific skills. This results in the extraction of value from the acquiring 
firms shareholders to the acquires management. 
 
The agency motive is directly linked to the concept of “empire building” where managers 
adopt strategies that expand the size of their empires by undertaking acquisitions that do not 
enhance shareholder value (Pangarkar., 2000). This occurs when managers attempt to 
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increase the size of the business through acquisitions with the goal of obtaining higher salary 
and prestige that is associated with managing a large corporation.  
 
Another driver of M&A by management at the expense of shareholder is the “Bandwagon 
pressure”. According to the bandwagon theory, firms will tend to imitate their close rivals 
regardless of whether such imitation is value-enhancing or not. If a number of rival firms 
have already completed mergers, other firms might be tempted to jump on the bandwagon by 
undertaking merger of their own (Pangarkar., 2000). This behaviour of management to follow 
the crowd confirms the existence of the agency motive in Mergers and Acquisitions 
transactions at the expense of the shareholders welfare. 
 
Management hubris also plays a major role in M&A transactions. The hubris motive 
postulates that managers make mistakes in evaluating the target firms and engage in 
acquisitions even when there is no synergy (Berkovitch & Narayanan., 1993). The hubris 
motive therefore implies that mergers and acquisitions are a result of management mistakes 
and cannot be expected to enhance shareholder value.  Berkovitch & Narayanan (1993) argue 
that mergers and acquisitions happen when managers overestimate their valuation of 
synergies. Bidding firms infected by hubris simply pay too much for their targets (Roll., 
1986). The over valuation of synergies by hubris management effectively leads to a transfer 
of wealth from acquirer shareholders to the target firms’ shareholders.  
2.3 Performance of mergers and acquisitions 
A plethora of research exists which examine the performance of mergers and acquisitions, but 
only a few have looked into long-term operating performance of firm post M&A transaction 
within the South African context. No studies were identified, domestically and abroad, which 
investigate how a regular M&A compares to a BEE related M&A in terms of economic 
performance of the target firm post the transaction. The study aims to fill this gap in 
academic literature relating to M&A. 
 
Previous literature on M&A transactions mostly examine the share price reaction to the 
announcement of M&A transaction. Based on these studies there seems to be a consensus 
about the performance of M&A transactions conducted in South Africa and across the globe. 
Jensen and Ruback., (1983); Bradley et al., (1988);Fuller et al.,(2002); Mushidzi and Ward 
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(2004)  as well as  Ward and Muller (2010)  agree that the shareholders of the target firms 
benefit significantly from a merger or acquisition while the shareholder of the acquirer lose or 
are unaffected by the transaction. According to Bradley et al., (1988) shareholders of both 
target and acquiring firms realise significant abnormal returns. However, most of the gains 
were captured by the stockholder of the target and both the rate of return and dollar gains to 
target stockholder increase over time. These findings are based on event study analysis which 
computes returns to shareholders as the changes in share price a few days before and after the 
announcement of the transaction. Studies by Healy et al (1992) and Bruner (2004), indicate 
that the merged firms total value increased after the merger therefore implying that 
shareholders of the firm do benefit from M&A. M&A activity does create net gains for the 
investors in the combined buyer and the target firms and thus presumably, for the economy as 
a whole (Bruner.,2004).  The combined equity value of the bidding and target firms increases 
as a result of takeovers (Healy et al., 1992) 
 
Jensen and Ruback., (1983) investigated the impact that successful as well as  unsuccessful 
mergers has on the returns to the target shareholders. Their finding was that target firms earn 
significant returns following an acquisition announcement , regardless of whether the merger 
is successful or not is  consistent with the findings of other event studies by Asquith (1983); 
Huang (1987); Bruner (2004) and Mushidzi and Ward (2004) which also found that target 
shareholder earn high returns from M&A. Targets of successful and unsuccessful tender 
offers & mergers earn significantly positive abnormal returns on announcement of the offer 
regardless of whether the offer is completed or fails (Jensen and Ruback., 1983). Asquith, 
(1983) noted that an increase in the probability of a merger benefits the shareholders of the 
target firm & a decrease in the probability of the merger harms both the shareholders of the 
target and bidder. 
 
A study by Wang and Xie, (2008) examines the relationship between corporate governance 
and synergetic gains of an M&A transaction. They found that when the acquirer has strong 
corporate governance due to stronger shareholder rights it leads to an improved performance 
in the target. The opportunity to redirect the target company toward more profitable operation 
would seem to suggest greater opportunity for a profitable merger (Bruner., 2004). 
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Mushidzi and Ward (2004) found that in South Africa, average abnormal returns for the 
target company increased considerably two days before the acquisition announcement and 
then ceased on day 0, then decrease to day +2 and thereafter fluctuate and level off. Huang 
and Walking (1987) agree with these findings and noted that abnormal returns decline 1.8% 
over a 50 day post announcement period. Approximately 54% target firms experience 
negative returns after the merger (Huang and Walking., 1987).  
 
Accounting based performance measures are used in the study for performance analysis. 
Though they have certain limitations, accounting studies examine the reported financial 
results of a firm before and after the acquisition to see how financial performance has 
changed (Bruner., 2004). A problem with stock market event studies is that they are not 
suitable for measuring the pre- and post-acquisition performance of unquoted companies, 
contrary to the accounting based studies (Ooghe et al., 2006). Stock price performance 
studies are unable to determine whether takeovers create real economic gains and to identify 
sources of such gains. Researchers using event studies have had little success in relating the 
equity value gains to improvements in subsequent performance (Healy et al., 1992). 
 
Accounting based performance measures have been criticised by academics and industry 
professionals for their deficiencies in measuring shareholder welfare in a meaningful manner. 
Traditional accounting based measures such as Return on Investment (ROI), Returns on 
Equity (ROE), Residual Income (RI) & Price Earnings (PE) ratio are based on accounting 
data that is susceptible to management manipulation, and therefore these measures may 
distort the true value destruction/creation of management decisions. These methods of 
performance measurement do not explicitly consider the cost incurred by providers of capital 
to generate the required returns.  They lack a formal mechanism for determining whether 
achieving management goals creates value for shareholder (Yook., 2004). 
 
Despite the shortfalls of the accounting based measures and the existence of a superior 
performance evaluation method (EVA), Chen and Dodd., (1997) find that the accounting 
measures are still of significant informational value and should be used alongside Economic 
Value Added (EVA). 
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Economic value added was introduced by consulting firm Stewart Stern & Co. The Stewart 
and Stern & Co system of performance measurement (EVA) is designed to provide a single, 
value-based measure which can be used in evaluating business strategies, valuing acquisitions 
and capital projects (O’Hanlon & Peasnell., 1998). According to Tully (1993) managers who 
run their companies according to the precepts of EVA have hugely increased the value of 
their companies and investors that are aware of EVA and which companies are employing it 
have grown rich. Economic Value Added (EVA) is a popular non-accounting based 
performance measurement technique. EVA is essentially the residual income that remains 
after all cost have been recognised, including opportunity cost of equity employed (Yook., 
2004). Costigan and Lovata., (2002); Yook., (2004) agree that EVA is a performance 
measure that aligns manager’s decisions & incentive to shareholder value.  Based on this 
contention by the authors, managers should only engage in M&A if it enhances shareholder 
welfare.  
 
Detractors of EVA method argue that it is not conceptually different from existing accounting 
based measure such as residual income (O’Hanlon & Peasnell., 1998). However these 
methods differ in terms of assumptions and faith in accounting information, for instance users 
of Residual income use reported values and while EVA aims to eliminate what is referred to 
as accounting distortions. Using accounting based measures of performance such as ROI will 
most likely lead to the same result as an EVA measure (Chen and Dodd., 1997). However the 
critics of EVA ignore a critical characteristic of the EVA method, that is, adjustment for 
accounting distortions. Therefore, EVA differs from accounting earnings in two ways: one, 
EVA redefines GAAP income; Two, EVA deducts the cost of both debt and equity capital 
whereas accounting earnings deducts only the cost of debt (Machuga et al.,2002). 
EVA is considered a superior performance measurement method and a valuable tool to the 
measurement of post M&A performance of target firms. Horwitz et al., (2002) suggests that 
the success of M&A can be measured by assessing Economic Value Added. Whatever the 
firm does, value created should be reflected in the EVA (Chen and Dodd., 1997). 
 
Based on the view advanced by Chen & Dodd.,(2007) and Horwitz et al., (2002) above, EVA 
is the most appropriate benchmark to use in assessing the success of a M&A transaction in 
South Africa regardless of whether  they are BEE related or not. Hence EVA will be adopted 
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for the purpose of this study as a performance measurement technique to be used to evaluate 
& compare the economic impact of BEE and Non-BEE related M&A. 
2.4 History of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
BEE is the economic  empowerment of all black people including: women, workers, youth, 
people with disabilities and people living in rural areas, through diverse but integrated socio-
economic strategies that include, but are not limited to: (a) increasing the number of black 
people that manage, own and control enterprises and productive assets; (b) facilitating 
ownership and management of enterprises and productive assets by communities, workers, 
cooperatives and other collective enterprises; (c) human resource and skills development; (d) 
achieving equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce; 
(e) preferential procurement; and (f) investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by 
black people ( Broad Based Black economic Empowerment Act No.53 of 2003). 
 
Black economic empowerment is an integrated and coherent socio-economic process that 
directly contributes to the economic transformation of South Africa and brings about 
significant increases in the numbers of black people that manage, own and control the 
country’s economy, as well as significant decreases in income inequalities (Department of 
Trade and Industry-DTI ). 
 
Wolmarans & Sartorius.,(2009)  identified three different types of transactions that can be 
used to implement a BEE transaction, namely: the selling of equity to a BEE company; the 
purchase of a stake in a BEE company and other BEE transactions such as the  involvement 
in partnerships and joint ventures. 
In a sale of equity to a BEE company transaction, the empowered company (acquirer) 
purchases a stake in the equity of the empowering firm (target firm). This type of BEE 
transaction is the most common and is driven by the need to accelerate corporate ownership 
and equity participation by black population.  
A purchase of stake in a BEE company transaction forms part of the Enterprise Development 
element. This transaction involves providing support to a BEE company to ensure 
sustainability which could be financial or non-financial. The purchases of a stake in a BEE 
company allow it to obtain the funds it needs to sustain its operations.  
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Partnerships and joint venture transactions involve the establishment of a separate entity to 
operate for the benefit of the empowering firm and the empowered firm. It involves the 
combination of resources by the firm in pursuit of a mutual goal. 
Levitt (2005) concurs with Wolmarans & Sartorius.,(2009)  and asserts that there are three 
ways to structure a BEE related transaction, including  where a BEE enterprise acquires a 
shareholding position, where a joint venture or partnership is structured with a BEE 
enterprise,  where broad-based ownership is structured (such as HDSA dedicated mining unit 
trusts or employee share ownership schemes). 
The political motive of BEE is economic inclusion of  previously disadvantaged “black” 
people, is akin to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) which is defined as actions that 
appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required 
by law (McWillians & Seigel., 2001). Notwithstanding the existence of BBBEE Act of 2003, 
compliance with the act is still not compulsory for firms. According to Alessandri et al., 
(2011),in spite of the increasing number of BEE deal, a large portion of firms never 
participate in BEE deals, highlighting the voluntary nature of this CSR activity. Many firms 
have demonstrated their corporate social responsibility by selling part of their equity to black 
empowerment groups (Wolmarans and Sartorius., 2009). Alessandri et al., (2011) and 
Wolmarans and Sartorius., (2009) concur that BEE deals conducted are largely motivated by 
desire to achieve social & economic transformation rather than profit maximization. 
However, it is not clear whether the market rewards or punishes target firms that get into a 
mergers and acquisitions with a BEE firm. 
2.5 Performance of BEE transactions 
Event studies on the performance of BEE generally find that the shareholders of firms 
experience positive returns in the long-term. Wolmarans and Sartorius, (2009) note that 
companies on the JSE experience significant positive average returns of 1.15% around the 
BEE announcement date.  A study by Ward and Muller, (2010) examined the effect of BEE 
transactions on companies based on market capitalisation and found that companies with 
smaller market capitalisation experience positive returns following a BEE deal announcement  
while large cap companies (>3,5bn) earn marginally negative returns.  Chipeta and Vokwana 
(2011) studied the impact of BEE announcements on short-term shareholder wealth and on a 
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firms’ profitability on the JSE noted that engaging in BEE transactions does not result in 
abnormal shareholder returns and that shareholders experienced negative wealth effects.  
 
Accounting based performance measures have been criticised by academics and industry 
professionals for their deficiencies in measuring shareholder welfare in a meaningful manner. 
Traditional accounting based measures such as Return on Investment (ROI), Returns on 
Equity (ROE), Residual Income (RI) & PE are based on accounting data that is susceptible 
management manipulation and therefore these measures may distort the true value 
destruction/creation of management decisions. These methods of performance measurement 
do not explicitly consider the cost incurred by providers of capital to generate the  required 
returns.  They lack a formal mechanism for determining whether achieving management 
goals creates value for shareholder (Yook., 2004). 
 
Despite the shortfalls of accounting based measures and the existence of a superior 
performance evaluation method (EVA), Chen and Dodd., (1997) found that the accounting 
measure are still of significant informational value and should be used alongside Economic 
Value Added (EVA). 
Chapter summary 
The chapter discussed previous research on how M&A impact returns. In addition, motives 
for M&A are examined while introducing BEE as a new and unique motive of M&A in South 
Africa. Event analysis studies show that M&A, whether BEE related or not have a positive 
impact on the shareholder returns. In the short-term, M&A have been found to have a 
positive effect on shareholder wealth following their announcement but in the long-term the 
share price gains tend to disappear as the share prices revert to previous trading value before 
the announcement and eliminating any gains attained in the short-tem. No studies have 
looked at long-term operating performance post-merger in South Africa.  The next chapter 
presents the methodology of the study.  
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
3.1  Introduction 
The chapter presents the methodology applied in the study including data, data sources and 
research design. The chapter is structured as follows; section 3.2 discusses the data and the 
data sources. Section 3.3 outlines the research design and the chapter summary concludes the 
chapter. 
3.2  Data & Data Source 
The research uses data on M&As completed in South Africa for the period starting in 2004 
and ending in 2014. Non-BEE M&A data was obtained from the Bloomberg database. 
Bloomberg data contains the name of the target & acquirer, the value of the deal, date of the 
deal and the payment method (i.e. cash, stock or both). Due to the fact that there is no central 
database of BEE related M&A transactions, several sources were used in the research study 
to identify BEE related M&A that are suitable for the study in order to conduct a performance 
comparison. Intellidex annual BEE reports and the JSE Securities Exchange News Service 
(SENS) were used to identify BEE M&A involving listed companies.  
M&A transactions were included in the study if the deal complied with the following criteria: 
One, the deal was completed. Thus, terminated and pending deals were excluded from the 
study. Two, the target company in the deal is listed on the JSE. Three, the transaction 
involved the sale or transfer of a stake in the target firm. Furthermore, financial services firm 
were excluded from the study due to incomparability with other sectors. For instance, 
NOPAT used for EVA excludes finance cost while financing costs are considered an 
operating cost by financial services firms and included in NOPAT which results to 
incomparability. 
The data yielded a sample of 86 M&A for the period of the study of which 33 deals related to 
conventional M&A and 53 deals were BEE related M&A. Although the sample is relatively 
small it is sufficient to conduct the study and draw meaningful conclusions from it. The size 
of the sample is impacted by the fact that listed firms are normally large and are seldom the 
target in an acquisition and also by the fact that data on M&A related to BEE transaction is 
scarce due the lack of a central database housing such deals. 
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Additional analysis is conducted in the research report on companies that concluded both 
types of deals (conventional and BEE M&As) within the study period as targets in the 
transaction. The objective of the analysis is to compare the effect of the two deals on 
performance of corporations that completed both deals. Transactions were included in the 
study if: One, a company completed both BEE and non-BEE M&A. Two, there is at least a 
three year gap between the deals in order to facilitate effective performance evaluation. 
Companies that concluded both types of M&A deals within a three year period or in the same 
year were exclude from the analysis to avoid confounding results. From the initial sample, a 
total of 17 deals were identified of companies that completed both types of deals. Subsequent 
to removing deals that occurred with a three year time horizon 13 deals were available for 
analysis.  
3.3  Research design 
3.3.1 Calculating performance using EVA 
The performance of the sample companies selected for inclusion in the study is evaluated 
using EVA as the main performance measurement technique. Supplementary corporate 
performance measurement techniques are used in conjunction with EVA.  
The EVA is defined by Steward Stern & Co as follows: 
 
)     (1) 
Where: 
NOPAT - Net Operating Income after Tax 
K - Capital 
CC - Cost of Capital  
 
NOPAT is the operating income of the company adjusted for tax, i.e., EBITDA*(1-t). Capital 
(K) refers to the capital attributable to the providers of financing to the company and cost 
capital (CC) represents the rate of return required by the providers of capital. In the EVA 
model it represents the hurdle rate, as it is the return that the firm investment decisions must 
earn in order to be considered value adding to the providers of capital. EVA shows how much 
value is added to the firm by the decisions taken by managers. The answer to equation 1 
above provides a measure of wealth added or eroded from the firm by M&A, through the 
calculation of “economic profit” (i.e. the amount by which the operating income after tax 
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exceeds the cost of capital). The answer to equation one could be positive or negative. If 
positive it means that the company was able to invest in projects that increase the value of the 
firm and overall shareholder wealth and if negative, the firm invested in projects that provide 
returns below the cost of capital and erode shareholders wealth.  
 
The superiority of EVA relative to similar accounting based measures such as Return on 
Income model is mainly due to the fact that EVA makes adjustments for accounting 
“distortion” in computing the NOPAT.  Thus, in calculating the NOPAT, a company can 
make approximately 120 adjustments to accounting profit (Net Income), however companies 
typically need only 10 adjustments to arrive at an appropriate EVA for performance 
measurement. The adjustments have the effect of taking the accounting method used to 
prepare financial statements back towards “economic value” accounting. The adjustments are 
made in order to deal with the problems of earnings management, past accounting error and 
accounting conservatism, through the removal of non-cash flow items and the accrual 
concept of accounting advocated by IFRS/GAAP from the profits of the company (O’Hanlon 
& Peasnell., 1998). 
3.3.2 Accounting based performance measures:  
Accounting based corporate performance measurement techniques are used in the study in 
addition to EVA. These measures focus on evaluating returns earned by providers of capital 
and include Earning per share (EPS), Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Capital (ROC). 
3.3.2.1  Earnings per Share 
 
The earnings per share serves as an indicator of the company’s profitability and is the portion 
of the company’s profit that is attributed to each share outstanding. It is the return earned by 
the shareholder for each share that he/she owns.  
 
     (2) 
Where: 
Net income - total earning reported in the financial statement 
Issued shares - this is the total number of shares outstanding as reported in the financial 
statements. 
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3.3.2.2  Return on Equity 
The return on equity is the percentage return earned on the equity invested by the 
shareholders of the firm.  
 
       (3) 
Where: 
Net income - total earning reported in the financial statement 
Equity capital - book value of issued equity. 
3.3.2.3  Return on Capital 
The return on capital (ROC) is indicative of how well the company uses its capital. ROC 
measures a company’s ability to generate returns using all capital at its disposal (i.e. debt & 
equity).  
 
     (4) 
Where: 
NOPAT - Net Operating Income after Tax 
Total capital – Total debt and equity capital 
3.3.3 Statistical analytical method 
The mean paired t-test is employed in the analysis in order to establish whether or not the 
change in the performance is statistically significant. A two tailed test will be used based on 
the following hypothesis. 
H0: Post M&A returns for BEE and non-BEE mergers and acquisitions are not significantly 
different from pre M&A returns. 
Ha: Post M&A return for BEE and non-BEE mergers and acquisitions are significantly 
different pre M&A returns.   
Chapter summary 
The chapter outlined the methodology and the data used to evaluate performance of the target 
firm in M&A deals. The main tool used in assessing the corporate performance of the 
selected companies (i.e. EVA) is explained in the chapter as well as supplementary 
performance evaluation techniques that are used in this research. The next chapter present the 
research results. 
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Chapter 4 Presentation of results 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics of the sample and later presents the empirical 
results. The chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 presents the sample characteristics. 
Section 4.3 performances of BEE and non-BEE M&As and the chapter summary concludes 
the chapter. 
4.2  Sample Characteristics 
4.2.1 Distribution of sample by Industry 
Table 1 presents BEE and non-BEE related M&A deals by industry. Industries that did not 
have M&A deals were excluded from the analysis. The industrials and basic materials 
industries accounted for 29% & 26% of total deals respectively. Cumulatively, the two 
industries (Industrials& Basic materials) account for more than half of the deals undertaken 
during the sample period. Classification based on the nature of the deals (BEE & non-BEE) 
reveals that the industrial and basic materials industries contributed significantly to the 
number of deals undertaken between 2004 and 2014. Basic materials industry contributed 
25% to BEE related deals and 27% to non-BEE related deals, while the Industrial sector 
contributed 32% and 24%, respectively. The two industries – basic materials and industrials- 
were the main drivers of M&A deals undertaken during the sample period. The remaining 
four sectors jointly contributed 45% to the total deals, with the consumer goods industry 
being the highest contributor with 19% total contribution to total deals. 
Table 1: Transactions by Industry and nature of deals 
  
INDUSTRY 
BEE Deal  Non BEE Deal Total 
No. of 
Deals 
% Deals No. of 
Deals 
% Deals No. of 
Deals 
% Deals 
Basic Materials 13 25% 9 27% 22 26% 
Consumer Goods 9 17% 7 21% 16 19% 
Consumer Services 7 13% 4 12% 11 13% 
Healthcare 4 8% 3 9% 7 8% 
Industrials 17 32% 8 24% 25 29% 
Telecommunications 3 6% 2 6% 5 6% 
Grand Total 53 100% 33 100% 86 100% 
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4.2.2 Distribution by payment method and deal type 
Table 2 reveals the nature of the payment structures used in financing the different types of 
M&A. Approximately 50% of companies that disposed of a share of the organisation have 
opted to receive cash, while 47% of the companies do not disclose the payment method. Less 
than 50% of the BEE deals entail the corporation receiving cash when relinquishing their 
shares in a BEE linked M&A. This is consistent with the fact that most of the empowerment 
groups do not have sufficient funds for an outright purchase of shares in the target firm. 
Similarly, non-BEE related M&A prefer cash when selling a stake in the firm. Cash related 
share disposals by firms accounted for 96% of all non-BEE related M&A. Based on the data 
in table 2, it could be inferred that the companies prefer to receive cash that can be ploughed 
back into the business and generate synergies. 
Table 2: Transactions based on payment method 
Payment 
Method 
BEE Deal  Non BEE Deal Total 
Deal 
Value 
(Mil) 
% of 
deal 
value 
Deal 
Value 
(Mil) 
% of 
deal 
value 
Deal 
Value 
(Mil) 
% of 
deal 
value 
Cash 35 632 44% 9 308 96% 44 940 49% 
Cash and Stock 279 0% 0 0% 279 0% 
Debt 1 500 2% 0 0% 1 500 2% 
Stock 1 569 2% 341 4% 1 909 2% 
Undisclosed 42 835 52% 66 1% 42 900 47% 
Grand Total 81 814 100% 9 714 100% 91 529 100% 
4.2.3 Distribution by year and deal value  
Table 3 shows the year , numbers as well as the value of M&A in South Africa. The non-BEE 
related M&A appears evenly distributed over the period of the study, except in 2006 when 
they peaked at 6 deals. BEE related M&A exhibit a spike in 2005, with 16 deals. The spike in 
deals could be attributed to a rush to comply with the BBBEE Act introduced two years prior. 
An inspection of the value of deals reveals that the value of BEE related M&A in 2008 was at 
its highest since the introduction of BBBEE Act. Non-BEE related M&A deal values 
increased to R 2 469 million and averaged R 2 136 million between 2008 and 2010. From 
2009 to 2011 non-BEE deals experienced an upswing after dipping to 0% in 2007. The 
increase can be attributed to the global financial crises which saw company values plummet 
thus, encouraging acquirers to spend more. The lower asset/share prices could have prompted 
the increase in acquisitions as most stocks may have been perceived to be undervalued and 
trading below their fundamental values. The 2010 soccer world cup may also have been a 
contributing factor to the increase in M&A activity in South Africa during this time, the 
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country was viewed as an attractive investment destination. Overall M&A activity in South 
Africa seems to have decelerated post the 2010 soccer world cup, with only a cumulative 
total of 18% M&A taking place after 2011. 
Table 3: M&A by year and deal value 
Year BEE Deal  Non BEE Deal Total 
No. of 
Targets 
Value 
of 
Deal 
% 
Value of 
Deal 
“000” 
No. of 
Targets 
Value 
of 
Deal 
% 
Value 
of 
Deal 
“000” 
No. of 
Targets 
Value 
of 
Deal 
% 
Value of 
Deal 
“000” 
2004 6 11% 1 090 2 6% 114 8 9% 1 204 
2005 16 30% 9 169 4 12% 177 20 23% 9 346 
2006 9 17% 2 608 6 18% 1 454 15 17% 4 062 
2007 6 11% 4 511  0%  6 7% 4 511 
2008 6 11% 46 810 2 6% 2 469 8 9% 49 278 
2009 3 6% 368 4 12% 1 307 7 8% 1 676 
2010 3 6% 16 600 5 15% 2 632 8 9% 19 232 
2011 3 6% 658 4 12% 805 7 8% 1 463 
2012 1 2% 0* 1 3% 61 2 2% 61 
2013  0%  4 12% 528 4 5% 528 
2014  0%  1 3% 167 1 1% 167 
Grand 
Total 
53 100% 8 1814 33 100% 9 714 86 100% 9 1529 
.*value of the deal was not disclosed 
 
4.2.4 Distribution by industry and deal type 
Table 4 below reports industries with companies that concluded both BEE and non-BEE 
deals within the sample period. The table shows the absolute number of deals, their 
percentage weighting as well as the total value of the deals. Only companies that under took 
both deals (i.e. BEE M&A and non-BEE M&A) are included in table 4. Thirteen companies 
completed both types of deals within the sample period. Companies in the basic materials and 
the industrials sector completed most of the BEE and non-BEE deals that took place during 
the sample period. The high number of deals within these two sectors is constant with the 
results presented in table 1, which showed that most the deals (BEE related & non-BEE) were 
completed within the two industries. The basic materials and industrial sector accounted for 
58% of the deals. The healthcare industry, though made up of a few companies, contributed 
15% to the total number of deals. The remaining industries accounted for a mere 27% of all 
the deals, suggesting that companies within these industries preferred to complete only one of 
the two types of deals but not both. 
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Table 4: Companies with BEE and non-BEE Deals 
 BEE Deal  Non BEE Total 
Industry % of 
Deals 
No. of 
Deals 
Value 
of 
Deals 
% of 
Deals 
No. of 
Deals 
Value 
of 
Deals 
% of 
Deals 
No. 
of 
Deals 
Value 
of 
Deals 
Basic Materials  31% 4 784 31% 4 1 938 31% 8 2 722 
Consumer Goods  15% 2 1 500    8% 1 808 12% 3 2 308 
Consumer Services    8% 1 1 100    8% 1 2 087    8% 2 3 187 
Healthcare  15% 2 136 15% 2 413 15% 4 549 
Industrials  23% 3 3 168 31% 4 277 27% 7 3 445 
Telecommunications 8% 1 872    8% 1 0*    8% 2 872 
Grand Total   13 7 560  13 5 523  26 13 083 
* Value of deal was not disclosed 
4.3  Mergers and Acquisitions performance analysis 
4.3.1 Trend Analysis of performance BEE & non-BEE deals. 
Figure 1 below, provides a trend analysis of the impact that BEE and non-BEE mergers and 
acquisitions have on the performance measures. The effect of M&A on the four performance 
measures employed in the study can be seen overtime (pre & post-merger). EVA® is displays 
the biggest decline due to the M&A transaction relative to the other performance measure 
followed by EPS. According to the figure, both BEE and non-BEE deals erode value; 
however the extant of the erosion differs between the two deals. EVA drops below zero for 
when non-BEE deal is completed – suggesting no value is added – and remains in negative 
territory for a prolonged period of time, while BEE related deals display a gradual and 
constant decline following completion of the deal. EPS measure concurs with EVA, as 
earnings per share experience a steep decline on deal completion and in subsequent years, 
more so for non-Bee deals.   
ROE and ROC are also impacted in a similar fashion to the other two measures, though to a 
lesser extent. ROE & ROC for  non-BEE deals commences a steady decline following the 
deal from T+0 to T+4, while the ROE and ROC for BEE deals initially decline before 
recovering. The recovery however remained lower than the average return levels achieved 
prior to the deal. 
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Figure 1: Performance measurement techniques of the study period. 
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4.3.2 Economic value added (EVA) Analysis 
The objective of this research is to analyse the long-term impact of BEE and non-BEE M&As 
on corporate performance using Economic Value Added (EVA) technique developed by 
Stewart Stern & Co to establish whether the shareholders of the target firms are better/worse-
off after BEE or non-BEE M&As. Table 6 reports the EVA of firms pre & post the M&A 
transaction. Prior to the M&A transaction, the two types of M&A deals exhibit positive EVA.  
Subsequent to the M&A transaction the EVA of BEE related transactions is positive for four 
years after the deal while the EVA of non-BEE mergers is negative for four out of the five 
years after deal completion. Considering the level of criticism aimed at black economic 
empowerment, these results are very intriguing as they indicate that both types of deals erode 
shareholder wealth though to a lesser extent for BEE related deals relative to non-BEE deals. 
In the acquisition year, BEE M&As have a mean EVA of R883 million while non-BEE M&A 
have a negative mean of R-212 million suggesting a complete destruction of value. The BEE 
related EVAs are positive for four out of five years after the deal is complete but they are 
lower than the values achieved in the year of the deal as well as prior to the deal. Non-BEE 
deals had a negative EVA in the year the deals were completed (T0) and in the four 
succeeding years (i.e. from T+1 to T+4), reaching their lowest value at R -939 million. EVA 
of BEE deals exhibits a gradual downward trend while the non-BEE deals experience a steep 
decline in the deal year (T0) and in subsequent years as can be seen on figure 1. Based on the 
observation that EVA declines after the deal, one may be tempted to infer that a portion of 
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shareholder wealth is eroded by the BEE & non-BEE M&A as the post M&A EVAs are 
lower than the average EVA achieved prior to the deal. Based on the empirical test results in 
table 5, the annual changes in EVA are not significant at a 5 percept level.  
Table 5: EVA-summary statistics for BEE and non-BEE Deals in Millions 
Year Mean Median t Stat t Critical p_value Year Mean Median t Stat t Critical p_value
T-5 641 58 - - - T-5 432 191 - - -
T-4 631 100 0.169 2.007 0.866 T-4 538 135 1.023 2.037 0.314
T-3 448 183 0.755 2.007 0.454 T-3 610 224 -1.066 2.037 0.294
T-2 806 217 -1.944 2.007 0.057 T-2 572 152 -0.400 2.037 0.692
T-1 953 186 -0.796 2.007 0.430 T-1 303 -1 1.146 2.037 0.260
T0 884 232 0.446 2.007 0.657 T0 -212 -4 -1.305 2.037 0.201
T+1 454 220 1.200 2.007 0.236 T+1 -72 -51 0.467 2.037 0.644
T+2 459 136 -0.010 2.007 0.992 T+2 -574 -204 0.718 2.037 0.478
T+3 8 158 1.136 2.007 0.261 T+3 -939 -252 1.322 2.037 0.195
T+4 252 31 -0.542 2.007 0.590 T+4 -489 -139 1.517 2.037 0.139
T+5 -5 0 0.813 2.007 0.420 T+5 663 0 -0.882 2.037 0.384
BEE Related M&A Deals Non-BEE Related M&A Deals
 
  
Mean paired (two tailed) t- test results: 
The mean paired t-test compared the average EVA attained before and after the M&A deal 
with the objective of assessing the statistical significance of the M&A deal on corporate 
performance. BEE related deals are found not to lead to statistically significant changes in 
EVA after the deal. As a result, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.  However non-BEE 
related deals are statistically significant at a 5% level of significance. The significance 
implies that the non-BEE deals significantly erode shareholder value. 
 
 BEE related deal  Non- BEE related deal 
t-stat  -1.4251 -2.8879 
t-critical  2.0066 2.0369 
p-value 0.1600 0.0069 
Decision  Insig Sig** 
** Significant at 5% level of significance 
4.3.3 Return on equity (ROE) analysis 
Table 6 presents the return on equity pre & post the M&A transaction. Return on equity 
shows that target companies experience an improvement in their ROE in the year of the 
M&A deal (i.e. T0). The ROE achieved by firms in both types of M&A deals is higher than 
the average ROE achieved in the five years prior to the M&A transaction. In the year the deal 
is concluded (T0) firms in BEE M&A achieved an increase of 37% in ROE while those in 
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non-BEE related M&A achieved approximately 283% improvement in their ROE when 
compared to the average return attained in the five preceding years.  Both BEE and non-BEE 
M&A ROE is positive after the deal is completed. ROE of BEE deals fluctuates and reaches a 
peak at 30.5% in year 3 (T+3) before showing signs of a decrease in year 4 & year 5. ROE 
for non-BEE deals improved in the year the transaction was consummated (T0) and peaked at 
21.9%, but subsequently declined gradually for four years after deal completion.   
The changes in the ROE as a result of the M&A transaction for BEE related deals are not 
significant except for the year preceding the deal (T-1). With regards to the non-BEE deals, 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the entire period covered in the research as the ROE 
is not significant.  
 
Table 6: ROE-Summary statistics for BEE and non-BEE deals 
Year Mean Median t Stat t Critical p_value Year Mean Median t Stat t Critical p_value
T-5 21.7 17.5 - - - T-5 20.2 17.3 - - -
T-4 13.6 16.3 1.689 2.007 0.097 T-4 -117.4 17.0 1.023 2.037 0.314
T-3 21.7 20.4 -0.855 2.007 0.397 T-3 16.3 20.3 -1.066 2.037 0.294
T-2 16.8 19.0 0.490 2.007 0.626 T-2 20.4 18.9 -0.400 2.037 0.692
T-1 21.3 20.9 -2.136 2.007 0.037** T-1 0.3 15.4 1.146 2.037 0.260
T0 26.0 21.4 -1.490 2.007 0.142 T0 21.9 16.3 -1.305 2.037 0.201
T+1 11.0 21.2 1.212 2.007 0.231 T+1 17.8 15.9 0.467 2.037 0.644
T+2 26.0 22.4 -1.071 2.007 0.289 T+2 14.7 15.2 0.718 2.037 0.478
T+3 30.5 19.9 -0.618 2.007 0.539 T+3 11.4 11.9 1.322 2.037 0.195
T+4 21.7 16.9 1.496 2.007 0.141 T+4 5.5 5.7 1.517 2.037 0.139
T+5 18.6 15.7 0.974 2.007 0.334 T+5 8.7 0.0 -0.882 2.037 0.384
BEE Related M&A Deals Non-BEE Related M&A Deals
** Significant at 5% level of significance 
4.3.4 Return on Capital (ROC) analysis 
Table 7 presents the ROC before & after an acquisition of a firm. The ROC behaves in a 
similar fashion to the ROE by exhibiting an improvement in the year the deal is completed. 
Similar to the ROE, the ROC of non-BEE deals improved in the year the transaction was 
consummated (T0) and peaked at 16.7% before beginning the gradual decline for four years 
post M&A. The ROC decreased by 64% between T0 and T+5. An inspection of the ROC for 
companies in BEE related M&A indicates that there was a 31% decline between T0 and T+5,  
however the post deal five year average ROC of 13.9% is slightly above the 5 years average 
of 13.4% achieved prior to the deal which insinuates slight improvement in performance. The 
changes in the ROC are not statistically significant for both BEE related and non-BEE related 
M&A except for the year preceding the BEE deal (T-1) and in year four(T+4). 
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Table 7: ROC-Summary statistics for BEE and non-BEE deals 
Year Mean Median t Stat t Critical p_value Year Mean Median t Stat t Critical p_value
T-5 13.9 12.7 - - - T-5 13.2 11.7 - - -
T-4 11.1 12.6 1.092 2.007 0.280 T-4 -121.6 13.1 1.000 2.037 0.325
T-3 13.7 13.7 -0.857 2.007 0.395 T-3 13.0 15.6 -1.031 2.037 0.310
T-2 12.8 13.5 0.344 2.007 0.733 T-2 15.3 13.4 -0.545 2.037 0.590
T-1 15.6 14.5 -2.428 2.007 0.018
** T-1 10.8 11.2 1.494 2.037 0.145
T0 17.7 15.3 -1.214 2.007 0.230 T0 16.7 10.7 -1.121 2.037 0.271
T+1 11.3 14.0 2.004 2.007 0.050 T+1 12.3 10.7 0.669 2.037 0.508
T+2 15.8 14.5 -1.092 2.007 0.280 T+2 9.3 7.9 0.976 2.037 0.336
T+3 16.4 13.1 -0.317 2.007 0.753 T+3 6.6 6.3 1.484 2.037 0.148
T+4 14.0 12.6 2.097 2.007 0.040
** T+4 3.5 2.8 1.371 2.037 0.180
T+5 12.2 9.4 0.823 2.007 0.414 T+5 6.1 0.0 -1.204 2.037 0.237
BEE Related M&A Deals Non-BEE Related M&A Deals
 
4.3.5 Earnings per share (EPS) Analysis 
Table 8 reports the performance of firms following a M&A transaction using EPS. The EPS 
measure indicates that the EPS achieved by target firms in the year of the deal (T0) is higher 
than the 5 year average attained prior to the deal in both types of M&As. However the EPS of 
companies in non-BEE related M&A experiences a consistent decline in the five year period 
after the deal, resulting in an average return of 9.5% which is lower than the 21.8% achieved 
five years before the deal. The five year average EPS for BEE deals is positive as it improves 
from a five year average of 5.4% prior to the deal to a five year average of 7.1% after the 
deal. The changes in non-BEE related M&A EPS are insignificant while the BEE related 
M&A are also insignificant except for the year of the deal (T0) and in year two (T+2). The 
earnings per share improved significantly in the year the BEE deal is completed suggesting a 
positive reaction from the market. 
Table 8: EPS-summary statistics for BEE and non-BEE Deals 
Year Mean Median t Stat t Critical p_value Year Mean Median t Stat t Critical p_value
T-5 5.2 1.4 - - - T-5 14.1 1.7 - - -
T-4 5.2 1.5 0.096 2.007 0.924 T-4 15.9 1.8 -1.755 2.037 0.089
T-3 5.1 1.8 0.092 2.007 0.927 T-3 24.2 2.4 -1.579 2.037 0.124
T-2 5.6 2.0 -0.587 2.007 0.560 T-2 28.0 1.9 -1.096 2.037 0.281
T-1 5.8 2.2 -0.528 2.007 0.599 T-1 26.6 1.7 0.576 2.037 0.568
T0 7.4 2.1 -2.507 2.007 0.015
** T0 26.8 1.9 -0.067 2.037 0.947
T+1 5.6 2.5 1.227 2.007 0.225 T+1 24.4 1.5 0.998 2.037 0.326
T+2 6.8 3.9 -2.046 2.007 0.045
** T+2 7.3 1.9 0.890 2.037 0.380
T+3 8.3 3.9 -0.902 2.007 0.371 T+3 6.9 2.2 0.382 2.037 0.705
T+4 7.9 4.1 0.371 2.007 0.712 T+4 5.0 1.2 1.144 2.037 0.261
T+5 6.9 3.9 0.590 2.007 0.558 T+5 3.8 0.1 0.773 2.037 0.445
Non-BEE Related M&A DealsBEE Related M&A Deals
 
** Significant at 5% level of significance 
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4.3.6 M&A Performance analysis by industry 
In addition to performance analysis, the study seeks to investigate which industries benefit 
the most from M&A in SA. Table 9 presents the change in EVA for the sample period 
according to industries. In BEE related M&As, basic material sector has the largest absolute 
decline in EVA in the year of the deal compared to the other industries for both BEE(R 
27 088 million) and non-BEE (R -10 076 million) related M&A. The decline suggest that 
both types of M&A erode shareholder value as operating performance deteriorates in the year 
that the deal is carried out.  
Examination of T0 and T-1 change in EVA for BEE related M&A reveals that target firms in 
most of the industries included in the study benefited from BEE transactions. Target 
companies that experienced negative change in their EVA one year preceding the deal (T-1) 
experienced an improvement in their EVA after the BEE M&A as their EVA improved either 
from a large negative value to a lower negative or from a negative to a positive value in the 
year of the deal (T0) with the exception of the basic material sector. However in the long-
term, the gains attained in T0 are erased as the EVA become negative, for a majority of the 
years subsequent to the deal; this phenomenon is most notable in the consumer goods, 
healthcare and industrials sector. 
The non-BEE related M&A eroded shareholder value as the EVA deteriorated across all 
sectors except for the healthcare sector in the deal year (T0). The EVA either changed from 
positive to negative or became more negative compared to the one year before the deal was 
concluded. The industrial, healthcare and consumer goods industries underperformed 
compared to the other industries as they each have at least three years of negative economic 
profit in the five year period after the deal. The basic material sector experienced four years 
of positive and rising EVA in the five years after having completed the non-BEE related 
M&A transaction, thus leading one to infer that non-BEE deals are value adding for 
companies within the basic materials sector. 
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Table 9: Presentation of performance by industry 
EVA  T-5 T-4  T-3  T-2  T-1 T0 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5
Consumer goods -1792 1788 -1910 -945 -556 3522 -161 -276 -170 -349 -324
Consumer services 238 216 445 408 463 176 199 290 365 -190 -900
Healthcare 393 210 469 348 -509 3167 -5022 2195 -5804 -991 -6379
Industrials 462 1798 1338 -1380 -1142 311 -1202 -2710 -2564 -146 2750
Telecommunications 1467 2587 4489 1770 -4556 -1702 15215 -20219 30834 -18744 -3168
Basic Materials -923 -15284 14539 5313 827 -27088 -8351 -3291 -10656 7439 10131
EVA  T-5 T-4  T-3  T-2  T-1 T0 T+1 T+2 T+3 T+4 T+5
Consumer goods 896 -353 -541 -135 -2736 -1341 130 544 -2226 -1928 -5176
Consumer services -284 420 831 -134 -80 -236 -338 431 233 -23 898
Healthcare 230 83 246 147 515 2165 -1747 -5422 -7808 7700 11064
Industrials 682 -1442 2089 -558 392 -2823 -1417 -3845 -3029 2042 -393
Telecommunications 3070 481 1374 1439 -3408 -5236 13150 -13145 425 -10028 18125
Basic Materials -2371 2606 -1513 1438 -4322 -10076 -4898 2422 4289 4611 6541
BEE Deal
Non BEE Deal
 
 
4.3.7 M&A Performance analysis based on companies. 
The study further investigated the impact that the two types of M&As have on corporate 
performance of a company that has conclude both types of deals by examining the financial 
impact of the deals at a company level. The objective was to determine whether the 
performance is better post BEE M&A or post non-BEE M&A. Table 10 presents the EVA for 
companies that completed a BEE and a non-BEE related M&A. Prior to concluding BEE 
related M&A, firms were able to achieve a 3-year average EVA of R 2 565 million but all the 
gains achieved by the companies were erased in the year that the transaction was completed 
as the EVA became negative at R -4 332million. Post deal, the average EVA continued to be 
negative at R -2 734 million. An investigation of corporate performance after completing a 
traditional non-BEE transaction showed that firm performance did not improve but worsened. 
The three year average EVA before the M&A was R -4535 million. The EVA declined to R-
15671million in the year the deal was completed (T0), subsequently the firms EVA declined 
to a three year average of R -4535million. Considering the details discussed above, firms do 
not seem to benefit regardless of which of the two deals they opt for and they are much worse 
off if they complete both deals. 
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Table 10: BEE and non-BEE deals based on companies 
 T-3  T-2  T-1  T0  T+1  T+2  T+3
Adcock Ingram Ltd 158 355 -289 74 9 -202 -624
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 306 -1 019 -43 -792 560 -1 160 1 173
Assore Ltd -158 45 370 -252 7 1 654 -641
Barloworld Ltd 3 0 -6 -3 -1 3 2
Gold Fields Ltd 586 1 513 157 -3 283 77 1 833 -5 301
Grindrod Ltd 647 -1 375 -944 117 9 -533 -458
Illovo Sugar Ltd 247 -406 -342 328 230 -19 -102
Massmart s Ltd 93 100 -258 350 738 -144 119
Mediclinic  Ltd 31 44 57 -168 229 2 565 -4 825
M&R Ltd -203 28 -88 309 139 -327 -976
Sasol  Ltd 1 507 -2 685 5 559 -1 154 -11 791 -2 272 6 275
Steinhoff Ltd -62 -32 232 -44 -185 322 -94
Telkom SA SOC Ltd 3 403 -142 304 286 -4 452 -5 922 15 857
 T-3  T-2  T-1  T0  T+1  T+2  T+3
Adcock Ingram Ltd 0 158 355 -289 74 9 -202
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd -43 -792 560 -1 160 1 173 1 438 -462
Assore Ltd 1 654 -641 -1 838 1 783 750 -6 504 2 075
Barloworld Ltd 752 -17 -11 -491 203 -521 -1 144
Gold Fields Ltd 157 -3 283 77 1 833 -5 301 1 677 -2 529
Grindrod Ltd 647 -1 375 -944 117 9 -533 -458
Illovo Sugar Ltd 247 -406 -342 328 230 -19 -102
Massmart Ltd 738 -144 119 -593 -154 37 -209
Mediclinic  Ltd 57 -168 229 2 565 -4 825 -131 -7 507
M&R Ltd -88 309 139 -327 -976 -1 391 474
Sasol  Ltd -2 685 5 559 -1 154 -11 791 -2 272 6 275 6 168
Steinhoff Ltd -624 995 -1 385 -1 725 311 -48 -849
Telkom SA SOC Ltd 304 286 -4 452 -5 922 15 857 -13 270 -960
Non BEE Deal
BEE Deal
 
Chapter summary 
The chapter presented the financial impact of disposing of a stake in the company in a BEE 
related & non-BEE related transaction from the perspective of the target firm. According to 
EVA, BEE related M&As produce a positive but declining EVA value while non-BEE deal 
show that EVA of target firm became negative in the year the deal was completed and 
remained in negative territory for four years.  Overall, the performance measures applied in 
the study do not indicate that there is a significant deterioration in the performance of the firm 
as a result of completing anyone of the two types of M&A deals. The last chapter discusses 
the results and conclude the thesis. 
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Chapter 5:  Discussion and Conclusion  
5.1 Introduction 
The chapter aims to shed light on the results presented in the preceding chapter and provide a 
conclusion on whether or not the different types of M&A covered in the study create value 
for the target firms.  The chapter is segmented into two sections. Section 5.2 presents a 
summary discussion of the findings. Section 5.3 provides the conclusions of the study.  
5.2 Discussion of findings  
The study undertook an investigation into corporate performance of firms embarking on 
M&A in South Africa, specifically focusing on the target firms operating performance. 
Economic value added (EVA) was used as a performance measure & supplemented by 
conventional accounting based performance evaluation methods such as return on equity, 
return on capital & earnings per share. The goal was not to conduct an event study whereby 
the share price reaction to an announcement is studied, but to examine the impact of M&A on 
operating performance & to conclude on whether synergies from the transaction eventually 
materialise from the target firms perspective. 
 
The main performance measurement method used in the study (EVA) indicated that target 
firms of both types of M&A experienced a decline in operating performance when 
completing the deal and in subsequent years. Non-BEE M&A experienced the worst decline 
in absolute value compared to BEE related M&A, which also turned out to be statistically 
significant. Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Capital (ROC) methods found that there 
was a slight improvement in the return earned by target firm following the completion of an 
M&A deal. The average five year returns achieved subsequent to the deal were found to be 
marginally higher than the average five years returns attained prior to deal completion for 
both performance measures, therefore implying an improvement in performance over a five 
year period. Using earnings the per share (EPS) method, it is noted that the returns per share 
earned by shareholder improved slightly for BEE related M&A while non-BEE related 
transaction experienced a decline in performance consistent with the decline observed when 
using the EVA.  
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Economic profit of conventional M&A as measured by EVA decreased when the deal was 
completed and remained negative for four out of five years, while the EVA for BEE related 
M&A deteriorated over the five year period after the disposal of a stake in the firm but 
remained positive for four out of five years. This finding of the study is akin to that of 
Yook.,(2004) who used EVA to examine operating performance from the acquirer’s 
perspective and found that firms experience deteriorating post acquisition performance after 
completing an acquisition. Wang and Xie, (2008) found that when the acquirer has strong 
corporate governance and strong shareholder right in the target, it led to improved 
performance in the target firm. These observations explain why the M&A studied yielded 
disappointing results for the target firms. Acquires in the M&A transactions studied do not 
have sufficient shareholder rights to influence corporate policy and governance in the target 
thus leading to poor performance. They are unable to restructure and transform the entity to 
generate positive economic profits and the envisaged synergies.  According to Yook,(2004) 
the decline in operating performance is linked largely to industry effects, that is, industries 
experiencing poor operating performance are likely to be the objects of takeover attempts. 
This assertion supports the results of this study carried out in order to determine the impact of 
M&A (BEE or non-BEE) on corporate performance based on industry. The study discovered 
that most industries that experienced poor performance prior to the merger showed an 
improvement when the merger was completed but the improvement in industry performance 
was short-lived as operating performance deteriorated soon after deal completion as EVA 
was negative for most of the post M&A period. 
This finding attest to the notion that the inability of the acquirer to influence governance of 
the target in the deals studied could be responsible for lacklustre performance of firms in 
BEE and non-BEE M&A. The inability of the acquirer to positively influence the targets 
business strategy and steer those firm to success could be compounded by the fact that the 
targets may have been experiencing poor performance prior to the merger. For instance, some 
firm may be spurred on to sell a stake in a BEE deal by poor performance and the hope that 
an improved BEE status may lead to more business from government. Furthermore, because 
BEE investors have no influence on governance they are unable to meaningfully improved 
corporate performance. 
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The decline in EVA for BEE related M&A may be exacerbate by the fact that some 
companies view BBBEE act as a legal burden that they must comply with in order to improve 
their BEE ratings. This attitude of target corporations may lead to the deal not being 
structured adequately as to enable the company to maximize the synergies linked to BEE 
transactions. Alessandri et al.,(2011) concurs as they found  that BEE deals create value when 
pursued in earnest  and destroy value otherwise. The findings in the study are in agreement 
with those of Huang and Walking, (1987) who conducted an event study analysis and found 
that more that 50% of target firms experience negative returns in mergers. According to 
Chipeta and Vokwana,(2011) BEE mergers and acquisitions erase shareholder wealth as 
firms experience negative cumulative annual returns. 
5.3 Conclusion 
Based on the research conducted, the appropriate inference that one can make is that BEE as 
well as non-BEE related M&A resulted in a decrease & erosion of economic profit of 
corporations included in the study. The conclusion is similar to that of Makhele.,(2013) who 
found that firms in M&A acquisitions experience a deterioration in operating performance, 
however these changes were found not to be  significant. The decline in EVA suggests that 
M&A do not benefit the target firms through improve performance.  
The synergies cited as benefits of mergers do not materialise for the target firms since  
operating performance does not improve substantially subsequent to the M&A transaction. 
The conclusion of this research study may differ from prior research studies largely because 
previous studies were event studies and focused on price changes to the M&A announcement 
which may include irrational “noise” trading by the market while the focus of the study was 
on operating performance which is not influenced by irrational behaviour of the market.  
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